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Principles in Newton’s Natural Philosophy  




Newton’s great work of ‘rational mechanics’ is supposedly about principles.  They’re 
even in the title: Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica.  However, Newton’s use of the 
term ‘principle’ appears to be unsystematic and opaque.  Was ‘principle’, then, just a ‘buzz-
word’ for Newton?  Or is there something important underlying his use of the term?  I 
support the latter.  While the term ‘principle’ did not play a central role in Newton’s 
methodology (indeed, I will suggest that hypotheses and theories are the important concepts 
for Newton), once we disambiguate his usage, something systematic arises.  What it takes 
to be a principle, by Newton’s lights, is to play a certain kind of role. 
 
0 Introduction 
Natural philosophy should be founded not on metaphysical opinions, but on 
its own principles (An unpublished preface to the Principia).1 
As this volume attests, principles mattered in the early modern period.  Calling a 
proposition a ‘principle’ signalled its importance.  It told you that the proposition was, 
for example, foundational, universal, essential, self-evident or demonstrable.  Principles 
played a central role in the philosophies of Leibniz, Spinoza and Hume, to name just a 
few of the figures featured in this volume. 
Newton’s great work of ‘rational mechanics’ is supposedly about principles.  It’s 
even in the title: Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy).  And in his preface to the first edition (1686), Newton expressed his hope that 
                                                 
1 Translation quoted in (Newton, 1999: 54).  I. Bernard Cohen has dated this draft to the years 
following the publication of the second edition of the Principia (1713) (Newton, 1999: 49). 
In Peter Anstey (ed.) (2017) The Idea of Principles in Early Modern 
Thought: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Routledge, New York. 
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“the principles set down here will shed some light on either this mode of philosophizing 
or some truer one” (Newton, 1999: 383).  Statements such as this one, and the choice of 
title, suggest that principles had an important role to play in Newton’s natural 
philosophy.  In view of this, one might have several expectations.  Firstly, given the huge 
amount of Newton scholarship conducted over the last three hundred years, one might 
expect some of Newton’s commentators to have carried out conceptual analysis of 
Newton’s use of the term ‘principle’.  Secondly, given his emphasis on principles, one 
might expect that Newton used the term in a systematic and transparent way. 
One might be disappointed. 
Newton’s commentators have spent a lot of time analysing key terms, such as ‘force’ 
(e.g. Janiak, 2007, Westfall, 1971), ‘hypothesis’ (e.g. Cohen, 1962, Cohen, 1969, Walsh, 
2012b), ‘cause’ (e.g. Janiak, 2013, Schliesser, 2013), ‘experimental philosophy’ (e.g. 
Shapiro, 2004), ‘query’ (e.g. Anstey, 2004), ‘explanation’ (e.g. Ducheyne, 2012: 47-49) and 
‘experimentum crucis’ (e.g. Bechler, 1974, Jalobeanu, 2014)—to name just a few!  But there 
has been surprisingly little analysis of his usage of the term ‘principle’.2  I shall redress 
this oversight by exploring the notion of a principle in Newton’s natural philosophy. 
Moreover, Newton’s use of the term ‘principle’ appears to be unsystematic and opaque.  
As we shall see, on first appearances, Newton’s use of the term is rough and messy.  Was 
‘principle’, then, just a ‘buzz-word’ for Newton?  Or is there something important 
underlying his use of the term?  I support the latter.  While the term ‘principle’ did not 
play a central role in Newton’s methodology (indeed, I will suggest that hypotheses and 
theories are the important concepts for Newton), once we disambiguate his usage, 
something systematic arises.  What it takes to be a principle, by Newton’s lights, is to play 
a certain kind of role. 
I’ll proceed as follows.  In section 1, I examine the principles in Newton’s published 
work, both his Principia and his Opticks.  I show, firstly, that Newton used the term in two 
ways, so I distinguish between propositional-principles and ontic-principles.  Then, focusing 
more closely on the propositional-principles, I show, secondly, that Newton applied the 
label ‘principle’ to propositions that (a) are deduced from phenomena and (b) function as 
premises in his inferences.  In section 2, I give an account of Newton’s propositional-
                                                 
2 The only obvious exception to this is J. E. McGuire’s brief discussion of principles in (McGuire, 
1970).  However, the scope of McGuire’s conceptual analysis doesn’t include Newton’s published work. 
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principles in their broader methodological context.  Drawing on Newton’s epistemic 
distinction between theories and hypotheses, I argue that Newton’s propositional-
principles are a kind of theory.  I then show that what differentiates Newton’s principles 
from other kinds of theories is the function they serve—Newton’s principles support his 
mathematico-experimental method in a crucial way.  In section 3, I test my account by 
turning to a draft manuscript, in which Newton enumerated four ‘Principles of 
Philosophy’.  Here, my account of principles is illuminating: of those so-called 
‘principles’, only the ones that (a) are deduced from phenomena and (b) function as 
premises became principles in Newton’s published work.  From this discussion, a 
particular feature of Newton’s use of the term ‘principle’ emerges: labelling or referring 
to a proposition as a ‘principle’ tells us about the function, rather than the content, of the 
proposition.  I argue that this highlights a more general lesson, namely, that when we 
study Newton’s methodology, we should emphasise functions and distinctions over 
content.  And so, I digress to study a case that illustrates this broader point.  I conclude 
that Newton’s application of the label ‘principle’ is exactly what we should expect, given 
his methodology. 
1 Two Kinds of Principles 
Newton’s use of the term ‘principle’ appears to be opaque and unsystematic.  Firstly, it is not 
at all clear what kind of thing the term ‘principle’ is supposed to pick out.  Neither the 
Principia nor the Opticks contains any propositions explicitly labelled ‘principle’.  Instead, 
the term is found in the discussions following the introduction of new propositions.  
That is, while no propositions are labelled ‘principle’, many propositions are referred to as 
‘principles’ in the scholia.  So a careful reading is required to figure out what the principles 
are.  Secondly, once we identify the principles in Newton’s work, it still seems that his 
use of the term is neither predictable, nor consistent.  One might assume, for example, 
that the ‘principia mathematica’ referred to in the title of Newton’s work are the 
propositions labelled ‘laws’.  However, when the term principle appears in the Principia, it 
refers variously to the laws, lemmas, other mathematical propositions and philosophical 
propositions.3  Moreover, in the Opticks, the term refers to the axioms of optics, universal 
                                                 
3 ‘Philosophical propositions’, or Natural philosophical propositions, are propositions concerning 
natural bodies and motions, as opposed to abstract mathematical ones. 
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gravitation, and the forces, powers and dispositions relating to the behaviour of light.  
So, at first glance, Newton’s use of the term ‘principle’ appears to be unsystematic. 
Newton’s usage, however, becomes clearer once we disambiguate between two kinds 
of principles: propositional-principles and ontic-principles.4  Table 1 below summarises the key 
features of these two kinds of principles. 
Propositional-Principle Ontic-Principle 
A truth or proposition on which others depend. A power, force or disposition. 
1. A claim about a thing 
2. Functions as a premise 
3. Known from the phenomena 
4. Truth-apt 
 
E.g. laws of motion, mathematical 
propositions, theory of universal 
gravitation, the Opticks axioms 
1. The thing itself 
2. Functions as a cause 
3. Known from the phenomena 
4. Not truth-apt 
 
E.g. the cause by which light is reflected 
and refracted, forces of attraction, passive 
and active forces. 
Table 1 Two kinds of principles. 
In this section, I shall consider some examples of both kinds of principles.  But before 
we begin, there are several things to notice about this distinction.  Firstly, these are 
related notions.  Very broadly-speaking, principles are foundational in both senses.  
Propositional-principles are foundational in that they are the premises from which other 
propositions are inferred.  Ontic-principles are foundational in that they are the causes of 
phenomena.  Secondly, these two notions are not well differentiated in Newton’s work.  
In particular, we shall see that Newton’s laws of motion have an ambiguous status in this 
classification. 
1.1 Principles in the Principia 
Since we are interested in principles, it seems fitting to begin with the Principia.  Here, we 
will find propositional-principles, but not ontic-principles.5 
                                                 
4 Here I follow Peter Anstey’s distinction between propositional and ontological principles (see the 
introduction to this volume). 
5 In section 1.2 we shall see that, in the Opticks, some of these are treated as ontic-principles. 
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In the Principia, Newton started with a set of axioms—his laws of motion.  These 
provided the fundamental mathematical conditions from which his system would be 
built.  Armed with his mathematical machinery—a geometrical form of infinitesimal 
calculus introduced in a series of lemmas in book 1 section 1—Newton proceeded, in 
books 1 and 2, to explore the mathematical consequences of his laws.  These, 
increasingly complex, mathematical consequences were stated as a series of 
‘propositions’, and further labelled as either ‘theorems’ or ‘problems’.  These 
propositions addressed topics such as the laws and effects of centrally directed forces, 
the three-body problem, the motion of minimally small bodies, the effects of air 
resistance on pendulums, wave motion and the motion of sound, and the physics of 
vortices.6  In book 3, Newton shifted from considering an abstract mathematical system 
to a concrete physical system: the system of the world.  Armed with a set of ‘rules for the 
study of natural philosophy’ and a list of ‘phenomena’ (detailing the motions of the 
planets and the moon), Newton employed the mathematical propositions from books 1 
and 2 to infer his theory of universal gravitation, and then to apply it to other 
phenomena such as the shape of the Earth, the precession of the equinoxes and the 
motions of comets. 
As I noted above, in the Principia, Newton did not label any proposition a ‘principle’, 
but he did refer to various propositions as ‘principles’.  For instance, in the scholium to 
the laws of motion, where he provided justification for the laws, he referred to them as 
‘principles’.  He wrote, “The principles I have set forth are accepted by mathematicians 
and confirmed by experiments of many kinds” (Newton, 1999: 424).  However, the term 
‘principle’ did not just apply to the axioms or laws of motion.  Evidently, it had a broader 
application.  For example, in the scholium at the end of section 1, in which Newton 
provided a mathematical system in the form of a series of lemmas, Newton referred to 
                                                 
6 While these topics suggest that books 1 and 2 deal with physical problems, these are treated as 
abstract mathematical problems.  For, as Newton explained in the scholium at the end of book 1 section 
11: 
Mathematics requires an investigation of those quantities of forces and their proportions that follow 
from any conditions that may be supposed.  Then, coming down to physics [i.e. natural philosophy], 
these proportions must be compared with the phenomena, so that it may be found out which 
conditions of forces apply to each kind of attracting bodies.  And then, finally, it will be possible to 
argue more securely concerning the physical species, physical causes, and physical proportions of 
these forces (Newton, 1999: 589). 
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the lemmas as ‘principles’.  He explained that he had included the lemmas to provide 
preliminary proofs of his mathematical tools so that he wouldn’t have to present them in 
detail later.  For, 
[…] we shall be on safer ground using principles that have been proved.  […  Moreover,] the force 
of such proofs always rests on the method of the preceding lemmas (Newton, 1999: 441-442). 
Furthermore, at the beginning of book 3, Newton referred to the (mathematical) 
propositions in books 1 and 2 as ‘principles’: 
In the preceding books I have presented principles of philosophy that are not, however, 
philosophical but strictly mathematical—that is, those on which the study of philosophy can be 
based.  These principles are the laws and conditions of motions and of forces, which especially 
relate to philosophy […]  It still remains for us to exhibit the system of the world from these same 
principles (Newton, 1999: 793).7 
Among other things, these principles include the laws of Keplerian motion.8  Some of 
the philosophical propositions of book 3 were also referred to as ‘principles’.  For 
example, in book 3 proposition 22, Newton wrote, “All the motions of the moon and all the 
inequalities of its motions follow from the principles that have been set forth” (Newton, 1999: 832).  
In this context, the ‘principles’ include Newton’s theory of universal gravitation. 
                                                 
7 In this passage, Newton made a distinction between philosophical and mathematical principles.  
Philosophical principles are those that describe natural phenomena, and are more properly called ‘natural 
philosophical principles’.  Mathematical principles are those that concern abstract mathematics or 
geometry.  Newton’s distinction between mathematical and philosophical propositions is important for the 
status of the Principia as a work of natural philosophy.  But it’s not important for the status of these 
propositions as principles.  As we shall see, they are called ‘principles’ because they perform the same 
general methodological function. 
8 Keplerian motion can be defined by three rules now known as ‘Kepler’s laws’: 
1. The orbit of a planet is an ellipse, with the sun at one of the two foci; 
2. A line segment joining a planet and the Sun sweeps out equal areas in equal times (this is often 
called the ‘area rule’); and 
3. The square of the orbital period of a planet is proportional to the cube of the semi-major axis of 
its orbit (this is often called the ‘harmonic rule’ or the ‘3/2 power rule’). 
See (Wilson, 2000) for an account of how these propositions came to be regarded as ‘laws’. 
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So far, we’ve seen that, in the Principia, Newton’s use of the term ‘principle’ was 
sporadic and obscure.  He did not use the term often.  But when he did, he used it to 
refer to a range of propositions—certainly not just the laws of motion.  It might appear 
that Newton was using the term ‘principle’ haphazardly, as a generic term for any kind of 
claim or statement.  But there are two constraints on Newton’s use of the term.  The first 
constraint is that each of the propositions referred to as a ‘principle’ had high epistemic 
status (at least according to Newton).  We have seen that Newton considered his laws of 
motion to have been confirmed by experiment and the lemmas proved mathematically.  
The rest of the mathematical propositions followed deductively from the laws and 
lemmas, and so were considered certain too.  Finally, the philosophical propositions were 
deduced from mathematical propositions and the phenomena, which, in Newton’s mind, 
made them certain too.  As we shall see, Newton considered all these propositions, 
including the laws, to have been ‘deduced from phenomena’.9  Moreover, Newton did 
not use the term ‘principle’ to refer to hypotheses or queries—i.e. those propositions that 
were not deduced from phenomena, and so, uncertain.10  The second constraint is that, 
each time Newton referred to a proposition as a ‘principle’, it was functioning as a 
premise.  This tells us that, for Newton, the term ‘principle’ was context-specific: the 
proposition was playing a foundational role in the context of a particular argument or 
inference.  This gives us two conditions for calling a proposition a ‘principle’: 
a) It is deduced from the phenomena; and 
b) It functions as a premise. 
Now let’s turn to the Opticks, in which Newton employed both kinds of principles. 
1.2 Principles in the Opticks 
The Opticks begins in a similar way to the Principia—with a list of ‘axioms’.  However, 
these axioms are of a different sort to Newton’s laws of motion.  Where the laws of 
                                                 
9 Newton frequently used the phrase “deduced from the phenomena” (e.g. Newton, 1999: 943).  
However, he didn’t always use the terms ‘deduction’ and ‘induction’ in their modern technical senses 
(Shapiro, 2004: 211-215).  Therefore, in keeping with Newton’s style of usage, I shall tend to use ‘deduced’ 
interchangeably with the less technical ‘inferred’.  For accounts of Newton’s use of the terms ‘deduction’ 
and ‘induction’, see for example (Davies, 2003, Ducheyne, 2005, Fox, 1999, Worrall, 2000). 
10 I shall address Newton’s distinction between certainty and uncertainty in section 2. 
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motion are about forces or causes of motion, the axioms of the Opticks describe 
generalised regularities or correlations.11  For example: 
Axiom I The Angles of Reflexion and Refraction, lie in one and the same Plane with the Angle of Incidence. 
Axiom II The Angle of Reflexion is equal to the Angle of Incidence. 
Axiom III If the refracted Ray be returned directly back to the Point of Incidence, it shall be refracted into the 
Line before described by the incident Ray (Newton, 1952: 5). 
These are statements about the geometrical properties of light.  They had been 
established by experiment and so they meet condition (a), they are deduced from 
phenomena.  Following these axioms, Newton wrote: 
I have now given in Axioms and their Explications the sum of what hath hitherto been treated of in 
Opticks.  For what hath been generally agreed on I content myself to assume under the notion of 
Principles, in order to what I have further to write.  And this may suffice for an Introduction to 
Readers of quick Wit and good Understanding not yet versed in Opticks (Newton, 1952: 19-20). 
This passage indicates that, as far as Newton was concerned, these axioms were 
uncontroversial.  They were supposed to provide a summary of the current state of 
optics; the basic mathematics required for geometrical optics.  Moreover, the passage 
states that these axioms would feature as basic assumptions in Newton’s treatise.  Thus, 
that they would provide a foundational role in the inferences in the Opticks.12  And so 
they also meet condition (b), they function as premises. 
As with the Principia, in the Opticks, the term ‘principle’ emerges repeatedly.  Whereas 
the first usage looks similar to those we saw in the Principia, other usages look very 
different: they are ontic-principles.  Firstly, the term refers to the cause by which light is 
reflected and refracted.  For example, in book 3 query 4, Newton wrote: 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of these differences, see (Ducheyne, 2012: 219-222). 
12 In the Opticks, Newton didn’t make explicit reference to the axioms in his ‘proofs’.  However, Peter 
Achinstein has pointed out that we can only make sense of the proofs once we recognise that the axioms 
are implicitly assumed (Achinstein, 1991: 44, n. 28).  Thus, it seems plausible to regard Newton’s axioms as 
hidden premises in his arguments. 
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Do not the rays of Light which fall upon Bodies, and are reflected or refracted, begin to bend 
before they arrive at the Bodies; and are they not reflected, refracted and inflected by one and the 
same Principle, acting variously in various circumstances?  (Newton, 1952: 339) 
In this passage, the term ‘principle’ applies to some sort of mechanism or power which 
causes light to bend.  There are similar usages of the term in books 1 and 2. 
Secondly, the term is used to describe forces of attraction.  For example, in book 3 
query 31, Newton asked: 
Have not the small Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a 
distance, not only upon the Rays of Light for reflecting, refracting, and inflecting them, but also 
upon one another for producing a great Part of the Phænomena of Nature?  (Newton, 1952: 375-
376) 
Arguing that we can only learn about such powers, virtues or forces by studying their 
effects, he went on to discuss gravitational attraction, magnetic attraction, electrical 
attraction and finally chemical reactions, eventually asking: 
[…] is it not for want of an attractive virtue between the Parts of Water and Oil, or Quick-silver 
and Antimony, of Lead and Iron, that these Substances do not mix; and by a weak Attraction, that 
Quick-silver and Copper mix difficultly; and from a strong one, that Quick-silver and Tin, 
Antimony and Iron, Water and Salts, mix readily?  And in general, is it not from the same Principle 
that Heat congregates homogeneal Bodies, and separates heterogeneal ones?  (Newton, 1952: 383) 
Here, the term ‘principle’ applies to the forces, powers or dispositions that cause bodies 
to interact in certain ways. 
Finally, in book 3 query 31, Newton distinguished between active and passive 
principles.  For example, in his discussion of the force of inertia, Newton wrote: 
The Vis intertiæ is a passive Principle by which Bodies persist in their Motion or Rest, receive 
Motion in proportion to the Force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted.  By this 
Principle alone there never could have been any Motion in the World.  Some other Principle was 
necessary for putting Bodies into Motion; and now they are in Motion, some other Principle is 
necessary for conserving the Motion (Newton, 1952: 397). 
Here, Newton tells us that a material body, on its own, is passive—i.e. brute and 
inanimate.  If at rest, it cannot begin to move, and if in motion, it can neither stop 
completely, nor change speed or direction.  This disposition to remain at rest or in 
motion is what Newton called the vis intertiæ.  Newton conceived of this force of inertia 
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as a ‘passive principle’.  For a material body to change its motion, it requires an impressed 
force—i.e. an external force.  Newton conceived of such forces as ‘active principles’.  He 
argued that active principles are necessary, if there is to be any kind of motion in the 
world.13 
So in the Opticks, ‘principle’ referred to two kinds of things: truths or propositions, 
and forces, dispositions or powers.  In section 1.1, I identified two conditions for calling 
a proposition a ‘principle’ in that former sense, and we have seen that Newton’s axioms 
meet both conditions.  However, the majority of references to principles in the Opticks 
are references to ontic-principles.  Ontic-principles are powers, forces or dispositions 
that function as causes of phenomena.  Thus, the term was used to refer to some 
unknown cause of some particular effect.  It is significant that Newton relied heavily on 
ontic-principles in the queries to the Opticks.  These queries, particularly query 31, are 
well-known for their speculative content.  They explore the nature of light, whether it 
can act on bodies, its relationship to heat, its role in vision, and the nature of luciferous 
æther.  These topics concern a lot of unknown causes.  And the main function of the 
queries was to set out a future research program in order to learn about these causes.  
These causes could only be discovered by investigating their effects—they could only be 
known from the phenomena.  Thus, the term ‘principle’ seems to be a generic term, 
denoting some unknown cause of some particular effect. 
1.3 Summary 
We have seen that, in Newton’s published work, the term ‘principle’ had two different 
kinds of referent: propositions and things in the world.  In the Principia, Newton referred 
to propositions (e.g. axioms, lemmas, mathematical propositions and philosophical 
propositions) as ‘principles’.  Similarly, in the Opticks, he used the term to refer to the 
propositions labelled as ‘axioms’.  We found, however, that propositions are not labelled 
as ‘principles’, but only referred to as ‘principles’ in specific contexts.  Thus, in this first 
sense, principles are propositions that (a) are deduced from phenomena and (b) function 
as premises.  And so ‘principle’ indicates both the epistemic status and the function of a 
proposition.  In the Opticks, we also found a second, non-propositional, usage of the 
term.  Newton used the term to refer to the powers, forces or dispositions of objects.  In 
                                                 
13 For more detailed accounts of active and passive principles in Newton’s natural philosophy, see 
(e.g. Dobbs, 1991: 24-57 & 94-96, Westfall, 1980: 299-310). 
 11 
this second sense, a principle does not refer to a claim about a thing in the world, but to 
the thing itself.  Thus, we can distinguish between propositional-principles and ontic-principles.  In 
the Principia, we found only propositional-principles; in the Opticks, we found both. 
The two kinds of principle were not well-differentiated in Newton’s work.  For 
example, in the Opticks book 3 query 31, Newton was apparently talking about the laws 
of motion and universal gravitation as ontic-principles: 
It seems to me farther, that these Particles have not only a Vis intertiæ, accompanied with such 
passive Laws of Motion as naturally result from that Force, but also that they are moved by certain 
active Principles, such as is that of Gravity, and that which causes Fermentation, and the Cohesion 
of Bodies.  These Principles I consider, not as occult Qualities, supposed to result from the 
specifick Forms of Things, but as general Laws of Nature, by which the Things themselves are 
form’d; their Truth appearing to us by Phænomena, though their Causes be not yet discover’d 
(Newton, 1952: 401). 
However, in his letter to Roger Cotes (28 March 1713), Newton was treating the laws of 
motion as propositional-principles: 
These Principles [in this context, the laws of motion] are deduced from Phænomena & p general by 
Induction: wch is the highest evidence that a Proposition can have in this Philosophy. (Newton, 
1959-1977: V, 396-397). 
I do not think there is any contradiction here.  In some situations, Newton was thinking 
about the laws as causes in the world; in other situations, Newton was thinking about the 
laws as axioms in a mathematical system. 
Neither of these notions is a typical usage of the term ‘principle’ in early modern 
philosophy.  Consider, for example, the entry for ‘principle’ in John Harris’ Lexicon 
technicum (1708).  Harris described ‘principle’ as “a word very commonly and very 
variously used” (Harris, 1708).  He provided six different uses of the word: 
1) “a maxim, an Axiom, or a good Practical Rule of Action”; 
2) “a Thing Self-evident, and as it were Naturally known, and then ’tis usually 
called, a First Principle”; 
3) “Radiments or Elements; as when we say, the Principles of Geometry, Astronomy, 
Algebra; we mean the Doctrine or Rules of those Sciences”; 
4) “in Chymistry particularly, ’tis taken for first Constituent and Component 
Particles of all Bodies”; 
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5) In ‘modern chymistry’, “there are five kinds, or different Sorts of Bodies, which 
may by Fire be drawn from many mix’d Natural Bodies, and therefore which 
may in a large sense be called Principles”; and 
6) In a general sense, “the first cause of any Things Existence, or Production, or of its 
becoming Known to us”, such as the Aristotelian elements of earth, water, air and 
fire, the Epicurean principles of magnitude, figure and weight, and Boyle’s 
mechanical principles of matter, motion and rest. 
The first usage is intended in a moral or religious context, and doesn’t capture the 
usage of Newtons’ propositional-principles.  Nor does (2), for Newton’s principles were 
not self-evident, but deduced from phenomena.  Newton’s propositional-principles 
might, to some extent, be characterised by (3).  However, Newton’s usage of the term 
was both broader and more nuanced than this suggests.  Usages (4) and (5) are 
‘ontological’, as opposed to ‘propositional’.  However, where Newton’s ontic-principles 
refer to forces, powers or dispositions, these chymical principles refer to entities.  As 
Newman’s chapter in this volume attests, the latter is a more typical application of the 
term.  Finally, Newton’s principles cannot be characterised by (6), since, as we shall see, 
Newton didn’t conceive of his principles as the first causes.  Rather, he thought there 
were further causes to discover. 
In the Opticks book 3 query 31, Newton made the following statement about 
principles: 
But to derive two or three general Principles of Motion from Phænomena, and afterwards to tell us 
how the Properties and Actions of all corporeal Things follow from those manifest Principles, 
would be a very great step in Philosophy, though the Causes of those Principles were not yet 
discover’d: And therefore I scruple not to propose the Principles of Motion above-mention’d, they 
being of very general Extent, and leave their Causes to be found out (Newton, 1952: 401-402). 
This passage tells us several things about Newton’s notion of propositional-principles.  
Firstly, principles should be derived from observation and experiment, i.e. “from 
Phænomena”.  Secondly, principles are foundational in one sense, but not in another.  
On the one hand, the object is to understand “how the Properties and Actions of all 
corporeal Things follow from those manifest Principles”.  So principles are premises 
from which other propositions are inferred.  That is, they are foundational in that, once 
obtained, they provide the foundation for other propositions.  But on the other hand, 
“the Causes of those Principles were not yet discover’d”.  So principles are not 
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foundational, since they do not necessarily identify or stipulate first causes (or indeed, 
any kind of cause!).  For, as Newton said in the Opticks query 28: 
And though every true Step made in this Philosophy brings us not immediately to the Knowledge 
of the first Cause, yet it brings us nearer to it, and on that account is to be highly valued (Newton, 
1952: 370). 
Nevertheless, Newton’s contemporaries appeared to be comfortable about his usage 
of ‘principle’.  So, while his usage was unusual, I take it that it was within the realm of 
accepted usage.  Cotes certainly recognised it as appropriate to call Newton’s theory of 
universal gravitation a ‘principle’.  For example, in his editor’s preface to the second 
edition, he wrote: 
I know indeed that some men, even of great reputation, unduly influenced by certain prejudices, 
have found it difficult to accept this new principle [of gravity] and have repeatedly preferred 
uncertainties to certainties (Newton, 1999: 386). 
2 The Method of Principles 
So far, we have distinguished between propositional-principles and ontic-principles in 
Newton’s methodology.  In this section, I shall have a closer look at Newton’s use of 
propositional-principles, in order to understand where principles fit in Newton’s 
methodological framework.  I begin by introducing Newton’s distinction between 
theories and hypotheses, which, I argue, is the central epistemic distinction in Newton’s 
methodology.  I then show that, in Newton’s framework, propositional-principles are a 
kind of theory.  I argue that what differentiates principles from other kinds of theories is 
neither their epistemic status, nor their content, but rather their function.14 
2.1 Theories and Hypotheses 
A well-known feature of Newton’s methodology is his distinction between certainty and 
uncertainty.15  Newton contrasted the certainty of his own natural philosophical claims 
with the mere hypotheses and speculations which other philosophers found appealing.  
                                                 
14 Note that, in this context, ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ refer to singular propositional statements as 
opposed to systems of propositions. 
15 This distinction has been discussed by (e.g. Guicciardini, 2011, Shapiro, 1993, Walsh, 2012a). 
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Consider, for example, the following methodological statement from Newton’s earliest 
publication, ‘A new theory of light and colours’, from 1672: 
A naturalist would scearce expect to see ye science of [colours] become mathematicall, & yet I dare 
affirm that there is as much certainty in it as in any other part of Opticks.  For what I shall tell 
concerning them is not an hypothesis but most rigid consequence, not conjectured by barely 
inferring ’tis thus because not otherwise or because it satisfies all Phænomena (the Philosophers 
universall Topick,) but evinced by ye mediation of experiments concluding directly & without any 
suspicion of doubt (Newton, 1959: 96-97). 
At the time, this statement was quite scandalous.  At a time when the Royal Society 
valued epistemic responsibility, never claiming certainty when the evidence only 
supported high probability,16 Newton was making strong claims to certainty—and 
apparently without any special warrant! 
In fact, Newton thought he was warranted in making such claims, because he had a 
reliable methodology.  Newton’s approach was based on the idea that mathematics is a 
bearer of certainty—if one begins with certain axioms, one can reason deductively to 
certain theorems without epistemic loss.  He thought it was possible to apply this 
method of reasoning to natural philosophy: one can reason deductively from laws and 
principles to propositions in natural philosophy.  So, if one can establish certain natural 
philosophical laws or principles, it is possible to reason mathematically to certain 
propositions.  By reasoning in this way, Newton thought he could achieve a 
mathematical science.  The challenge, then, was to identify laws or first principles that 
met this requirement of certainty—via deduction from phenomena. 
Newton’s distinction between certainty and uncertainty is best characterised as a 
distinction between ‘theories’ and ‘hypotheses’ (outlined in table 2 below).17  In Newton’s 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Robert Hooke’s ‘Preface to the Royal Society’ in his Micrographia (Hooke, 
1966/1665). 
17 Here, I am not simply juxtaposing two terms of reference, but rather, making an epistemic 
distinction.  I use ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ as generic terms that are intended to capture a distinction 
between two kinds of propositions.  (By ‘proposition’ here, I am referring to the meaning of a declarative 
sentence that is the primary bearer of some truth-value.)  Newton rarely used the term ‘theory’ in his 
publications.  My definition of ‘theory’ fits his usage of the terms ‘law’, ‘lemma’ and ‘proposition’ (Newton 
frequently divided his ‘propositions’ into ‘theorems’ and ‘problems’).  Moreover, my definition of 
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methodology, theories and hypotheses deal with different subject matter, have different 
epistemic statuses and perform different roles in theorising.  Theories systematise the 
observable, measurable properties of things; hypotheses describe the (unobservable) 
nature of things.  Theories are inferred from observation and experiment; hypotheses are 
speculative.  For example, Newton saw universal gravitation—i.e. the proposition that 
any two bodies in the universe attract each other with a force that is directly proportional 
to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance 
between them—as a theory, since it was inferred from celestial and terrestrial 
observations, had empirically testable consequences and was used to systematise those 
observations.  However, an explanation of the nature and cause of gravity would be a 
hypothesis, since it concerns the unobservable nature of things, and is speculative, rather 
than inferred from experiment—and thus, any account Newton could give would be, at 
best, only probable.18 
Theory Hypothesis 
A proposition is a ‘theory’ iff it meets the following 
conditions: 
T1. It is certainly true, because it is reliably 
inferred from experiment; 
T2. It is experimental—something that has 
empirically testable consequences; and 
T3. It is concerned with the observable, 
measurable properties of the thing, rather 
than its nature. 
A proposition is a ‘hypothesis’ iff it meets one 
or more of the following conditions: 
H1. It is, at best, only highly probable; or 
H2. It is a conjecture or speculation—
something not based on empirical 
evidence; or 
H3. It is concerned with the nature of the 
thing, rather than its observable, 
measurable properties. 
Table 2 Definitions of ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ 
                                                 
‘hypothesis’ fits Newton’s usage of both ‘hypothesis’ and ‘query’ (assuming we read the latter as assertions, 
rather than questions).  In Newton’s usage, where hypotheses and queries come apart is in the role they 
play in his natural philosophy (see e.g. Anstey, 2004).  For a discussion of the distinction between theories 
and hypotheses in early modern philosophy more generally, see (Ducheyne, 2013). 
18 It is worth noting that hypotheses are closely related to ontic-principles.  ‘Principle’ refers to an 
unknown cause of a particular effect.  It is typically a place-holder for a force or power to which we don’t 
have epistemic access.  A proposition describing the nature or cause of an ontic-principle would be a 
hypothesis. 
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The distinction between theories and hypotheses is central to Newton’s 
methodology.  For Newton, theories were on epistemically surer footing than hypotheses 
because they were grounded on phenomena, whereas the latter were grounded in 
speculations.  And so hypotheses could never trump theories.  When faced with a 
disagreement between a hypothesis and a theory (e.g. suppose our theory seems to imply 
action-at-a-distance, but the most plausible hypothesis about the nature of motion tells 
us that action-at-a-distance is impossible), we should modify the hypothesis to fit our 
theory, and not vice versa.  The distinction was nicely captured in a draft letter from 
Newton to Cotes (March 1713): 
And therefore as I regard not hypotheses in explaining the phenomena of nature, so I regard them 
not in opposition to arguments founded upon phenomena by induction or to principles settled 
upon such arguments.  In arguing for any principle or proposition from phenomena by induction, 
hypotheses are not to be considered.  The argument holds good till some phenomenon can be 
produced against it (Newton, 2004: 120). 
While Newton railed against hypotheses—determined to preserve the certainty of his 
propositions and to avoid epistemic loss by keeping speculative conjectures apart—
hypotheses played an important role in Newton’s negotiations between certainty and 
speculation.19 
In the following section, we’ll see that Newton’s propositional-principles were a kind 
of theory, but performed a specific role. 
2.2 Characterising Principles as ‘Theories’ 
Newton’s (propositional-) principles were theories.  We have already seen that Newton 
conceived of principles as propositions that had been deduced from phenomena and 
therefore certain.  Thus, they fit the above definition of a ‘theory’.  Moreover, in 
statements such as this one from his letter to Cotes (28 March 1713), Newton explicitly 
contrasted his principles with hypotheses:20 
                                                 
19 For an extended discussion of the respective roles of hypotheses and queries in Newton’s natural 
philosophy, see (Walsh, 2014). 
20 This passage highlights a difference between Newton’s and John Locke’s notions of ‘principle’.  
Where Locke viewed principles as hypotheses (mere probabilities or conjectures), Newton saw principles 
as theories (i.e. deduced from phenomena and certainly true) (McGuire, 1970: 181).  For, unlike Locke, 
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These Principles [in this case, the laws of motion] are deduced from Phænomena & made general 
by Induction: wch is the highest evidence that a Proposition can have in this Philosophy.  And the 
word Hypothesis is here used by me to signify only such a Proposition as is not a Phænomenon nor 
deduced from any Phænomena but assumed or supposed wthout any experimental proof (Newton, 
1959-1977: V, 396-397). 
In section 1, we saw that Newton used the term ‘principle’ to refer to several 
different kinds of proposition: laws, axioms, lemmas, mathematical propositions and 
philosophical propositions.  Where the term ‘theory’ unifies all of these propositions on 
the basis of their epistemic status, ‘principle’ picks out a certain kind of theory, namely, a 
theory that functions as a premise.  Let us examine the function of a principle more 
closely by considering the inference structure of the Principia. 
The inference structure of the Principia, loosely goes as follows.  Newton started with 
his laws of motion.  He claimed that these laws are supported by experiment.  From 
these laws, with the help of his mathematical tools stated in a series of lemmas (i.e. his 
geometrical form of infinitesimal calculus), Newton inferred the propositions in books 1 
and 2 of the Principia (the ‘mathematical propositions’).  From the mathematical 
propositions, and supported by celestial phenomena, Newton inferred his theory of 
universal gravitation.  From his theory of universal gravitation and some planetary 
observations (more ‘phenomena’), Newton inferred other features of the system, such as 
his theories of the comets and the shape and motion of the moon.21  The tiers of this 
extended inference are summarised in figure 1 below. 
                                                 
Newton believed that universal statements could be established from phenomena.  For an account of how 
Locke’s notion of a natural philosophical principle developed in light of Newton’s achievements in the 
Principia, see (Anstey, 2011). 
21 This inference structure has been interpreted as hypothetico-deductivism.  For two compelling 
critiques of this interpretation, see (Harper, 2011: ch. 9) and (Smith, 2014). 
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Figure 1 Structure of inference in the Principia. 
We have seen that Newton applied the term ‘principle’ to propositions at every level 
of this diagram except the top one.  When Newton used the laws of motion to infer his 
mathematical propositions, he referred to his laws as ‘principles’.  Newton referred to his 
lemmas as ‘principles’ in a similar context.  When he used his mathematical propositions 
to infer his theory of universal gravitation, he referred to them as ‘principles’.  And 
finally, when he used his theory of universal gravitation to develop his propositions 
concerning comets and the moon, he referred to his theory of universal gravitation as a 
‘principle’.  In fact, the only propositions listed in figure 1 above that weren’t referred to as 
‘principles’ in the Principia were the propositions concerning the moon and the 
propositions concerning the comets.  In the context of the Principia, this is not surprising, 
since these were the final propositions in the Principia—they were not premises for any 
further arguments. 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that these laws and propositions were not 
labelled as ‘principles’, but only referred to as ‘principles’ in specific contexts.  The label 
was bestowed only circumstantially—to indicate a specific temporary function.  It was, 
nevertheless, an important function.  As we saw above, Newton’s mathematico-
experimental approach had two crucial components: (1) establishing certain principles by 
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deducing them from phenomena; and (2) reasoning deductively from those principles to 
other propositions (maintaining certainty).  The Principia gave every appearance of 
following Newton’s prescriptions for a mathematico-experimental science.  Starting with 
laws and a strong mathematical framework of lemmas, Newton inferred mathematical 
propositions and, eventually, philosophical propositions.  Moreover, in the scholium to 
the laws, Newton asserted that they were certainly true, because they had been confirmed 
by experiment.  Thus, he felt warranted in using them to deduce his theory of universal 
gravitation.  And so Newton conceived of principles as a kind of theory.  Namely, a 
theory that functioned as a premise in an argument or inference. 
2.3 Summary 
In section 1, we gleaned two conditions for calling a proposition a ‘principle’: (a) it has 
been deduced from phenomena; and (b) it functions as a premise.  In this section, we 
considered where Newton’s principles fit in his general methodology.  I introduced 
Newton’s distinction between theories and hypotheses—I regard this as a central 
distinction in Newton’s natural philosophy.  I argued that, by condition (a), Newton’s 
principles were theories.  They were deduced from phenomena and therefore certainly 
true; as opposed to hypotheses, which were speculative and uncertain.  I then argued that 
condition (b) distinguishes principles from other kinds of theories.  Principles are 
important because they are theories from which other theories are deduced. 
I now turn to a test case: a draft manuscript, intended as a preface for the Opticks. 
3 Some puzzling Principles 
In a draft manuscript, originally intended as the preface to the Opticks, Newton wrote an 
account of principles.22  The manuscript, which McGuire has called the ‘Principles of 
Philosophy’ (McGuire, 1970), provides the most extensive discussion of principles that 
can be found in Newton’s work.  In this manuscript, Newton gave an account of his 
method of principles and then enumerated the four principles which he regarded as the 
foundation for his natural philosophy.  The manuscript presents a puzzle for my account 
of Newton’s principles, since this is the only place we find principles explicitly labelled as 
such.  Moreover, of the four principles identified in this manuscript, only one of them is 
referred to as a principle in Newton’s published work.  Here, we shall find my account of 
                                                 
22 MS. Add. 3970. ff. 479r-479v. 
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principles to be illuminating: of those so-called ‘principles’, only the ones that meet my 
two conditions for ‘principle’ appear as principles in Newton’s published work. 
The manuscript opens with a discussion of methodology, which supports the 
framework I have outlined.  For example, the discussion ends with the following 
passage:23 
Tis much better to do a little with certainty then to & leave the rest for others that come after, than 
to explain all things by conjecture & leave without making sure of any thing.  And there is no  
↑other↑  way of doing anything with certainty then by drawing conclusions drawing conclusions 
from experiments & phænomena untill you come at such general Principles as are & then from 
those Principles giving an account of Nature.  This is ye only Whatever is certain in Philosophy is 
owing to this method & nothing can be done without it.   ↑I will instance in some particulars.↑ 
The themes in this passage are, by now, familiar to us.  Newton’s goal was to produce 
determinate natural philosophical claims.  That is, he wanted to achieve certainty.  Thus, 
in the trade-off between explanatory scope and epistemic strength, Newton chose the 
latter.  As far as Newton was concerned, the only way to achieve certainty in natural 
philosophy was to start by making observations and experiments, and then to infer 
general principles from the phenomena.  Such general principles would form the basis 
for an account of nature. 
Following these methodological preliminaries, Newton proceeded to enumerate four 
general principles of philosophy, providing evidence or support for them.  I shall discuss 
them in detail shortly.  But for now, I’ll simply summarise them: 
1) There exists an Intelligent Creator; 
2) Matter is impenetrable; 
3) All bodies in the Universe gravitate towards all other bodies in the Universe, in 
accordance with Newton’s theory of universal gravitation; and 
4) Sensible bodies are composed of tiny particles of matter with gaps between 
them. 
This manuscript is puzzling.  The ‘principles of philosophy’ appear to present a counter-
example to my account of Newton’s method of principles, since they do not function as 
premises.  Moreover, it is surprising that these ‘principles’ are labelled as such.  As I 
                                                 
23 Unless otherwise stated, all quotes in this section are from MS. Add. 3970. ff. 479r-479v. 
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pointed out in section 1, this never happened in Newton’s published work.  Finally, only 
one of these (so-called) ‘principles’ was referred to as such in Newton’s published work. 
In this section, I argue that the manuscript illuminates a particular feature of 
Newton’s method of principles, namely, that labelling or referring to a proposition as a 
‘principle’ tells us about the function, rather than the content, of the proposition.  In this 
way, Newton’s method of principles is an example of a more general feature of Newton’s 
methodology.  Thus, in section 3.2 I’ll digress to study a case that illustrates this broader 
point, namely, that when we study Newton’s methodology, we should emphasise 
functions and distinctions over content. 
3.1 Tracing the principles 
This manuscript may appear to present a counter-example to my account of Newton’s 
method of principles.  However, in this section, I shall argue that the manuscript in fact 
supports my account.  My argument rests on the recognition that Newton’s ‘principles of 
philosophy’ is a draft that was never published.  Only one of the propositions was ever 
referred to as a ‘principle’ in Newton’s published work.  Significantly, it was also the only 
proposition that fit both conditions for calling a proposition a ‘principle’.  While we can 
trace versions of the other principles in the Principia and the Opticks, they are never 
referred to as ‘principles’.  I therefore argue that, while Newton may have hoped to 
present these four propositions as principles, he changed his mind. 
Let’s start by considering the proposition that was referred to as a ‘principle’ in print: 
principle (3), Newton’s theory of universal gravitation.  That is, that “all the great bodies 
in ye Universe have a tendency towards one another proportional to ye quantity of matter 
contained in them & that this tendency in receding from the body decreases & is 
reciprocally proportional to ye square of ye distance from ye body”.24  In support, Newton 
summarised the evidence he provided for universal gravitation in the Principia book 3.  
For example, the pendulum experiments that he used in proposition 4 to demonstrate 
that the force that keeps the moon in orbit is the same force that causes heavy bodies fall 
to the ground—namely, gravity.  And also the evidence for proposition 5: that the 
moons of Jupiter and Saturn gravitate towards Jupiter and Saturn respectively and the 
                                                 
24 McGuire notes that this is probably the earliest non-mathematical statement of universal gravitation 
in Newton’s own words (McGuire, 1970: 184, n. 21). 
 22 
primary planets gravitate towards the Sun, and this force of gravity is responsible for 
keeping the moons and planets in orbit.  And finally, he noted that many comets seem to 
gravitate towards the Sun as well.  In the Principia, principle (3) met both conditions for 
‘principle’.  Firstly, it was ‘deduced’ from celestial and terrestrial phenomena such as the 
motions of the planets.  Secondly, it functioned as a premise from which the motions of 
celestial bodies such as comets were deduced. 
Now consider principle (1), that there exists an intelligent creator: “a God or Spirit 
infinite eternal omniscient omnipotent”.  To support this principle, Newton put forward 
an argument from design, explaining that “the best argument for such a being is the 
frame of nature & chiefly the contrivance of ye bodies of living creatures”.  To this end, 
he pointed firstly to isomorphic traits among land animals, such as the observation that 
they all have two eyes, a nose and a mouth, and secondly to the ingenuity of the 
functions of such traits.  Asking, for example, “What more difficult then to fly?  & yt had 
flying creatures their wings by chance? or has any creature wings without being able to 
fly? & yet was it by chance yt all creatures can fly wch have wings?”  Newton evidently 
found these arguments from the phenomena extremely compelling: 
These & such like considerations are the most convincing arguments for such a being & have 
convinced mankind in all ages that ye world & all the species of things therein & were originally 
framed by his power & wisdom.  And to lay aside this argument is very unphilosophical. 
The ideas expressed in this passage were clearly very important to Newton, since 
traces of them can be found in both the Opticks and the Principia.  For example in the 
General Scholium to the Principia, there is an extended discussion of God: 
This most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen without the design 
and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being […]  It is agreed that the supreme God 
necessarily exists, and by the same necessity he is always and everywhere […]  This concludes the 
discussion of God, and to treat of God from phenomena is certainly a part of natural philosophy 
(Newton, 1999: 940-943). 
The similarities between this passage and the draft passage above are striking.  Here, 
Newton was arguing from design for an intelligent creator.  Since arguments for 
intelligent design rest on observable phenomena of the natural world, Newton argued 
that understanding God and His creation are legitimate topics for natural philosophy.  A 
similar passage appears in the Opticks book 3 query 31: 
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Now by the help of these Principles [in this context, the laws of motion], all material Things seem 
to have been composed of the hard and solid Particles above-mention’d, variously associated in the 
first Creation by the Counsel of an intelligent Agent.  For it became him who created them to set 
them in order.  And if he did so, it’s unphilosophical to seek for any other Origin of the World, or 
to pretend that it might arise out of a Chaos by the mere Laws of Nature; though being once 
form’d, it may continue by those Laws for many Ages (Newton, 1952: 402). 
Principle (1) wasn’t referred to as a principle in the Principia or the Opticks.  And not 
because it wasn’t deduced from the phenomena—indeed, Newton thought that it had 
been deduced from the phenomena and was certainly true.  Rather, principle (1) didn’t 
appear as a principle because it never functioned as a premise, and thus, didn’t perform 
the role of a principle.  That is, it meets condition (a) but not condition (b). 
Now consider principle (2), that matter is impenetrable.  Newton explained, “This is 
usually looked upon as a maxim known to us by ye light of nature, altho we know 
nothing of bodies but by sense”.  That is, while others have taken this principle to be 
self-evident, Newton thought that compelling support for this principle would come only 
from sensory experience and the absence of counter-instances.  He explained: 
And such observations occurring every day to every man this property of bodies is acknowledged 
by all mankind men without any dispute & looked upon as an Axiom.25 
Newton was clearly committed to principle (2).  He thought that it was well-established 
and even deduced from phenomena.  It never appeared as a principle in the Principia or 
the Opticks, and yet, traces of this principle are found in both works.  For example, in the 
Opticks book 3 query 31, Newton wrote: 
[…] this seems to be as evident as the universal Impenetrability of Matter.  For all Bodies, so far as 
Experience reaches, are either hard, or may be harden’d; and we have no other Evidence of 
universal Impenetrability, besides a large Experience without an experimental Exception (Newton, 
1952: 389). 
                                                 
25 Newton often mentioned agreement among philosophers or mathematicians in discussions of 
empirical support.  Elsewhere I have argued that we should understand Newton’s notion of certainty as 
‘compelled assent’ (Walsh, Forthcoming): the evidence compelled him undeniably to his conclusion.  I take 
it that agreement among scholars supported this undeniability, the thought being that no rational person, 
having carried out the experiment, could deny the conclusion. 
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Again, the similarities between this published passage and the draft passage are striking.  
The impenetrability of matter is established from experience without exception—that is, 
from the phenomena.  The same idea is expressed in the Principia book 3, where Newton 
used the impenetrability of matter as his main example of the application of rule three.26  
He wrote: 
That all bodies are impenetrable we gather not by reason but by our senses.  We find those bodies 
that we handle to be impenetrable, and hence we conclude that impenetrability is a property of all 
bodies universally (Newton, 1999: 795). 
Newton argued that the proposition that matter is impenetrable was deduced from the 
phenomena, so it met condition (a).  However, the impenetrability of matter never 
functioned as a premise, and thus, didn’t perform the role of a principle.  That is, it met 
condition (a) but not condition (b). 
Finally, consider principle (4), that sensible bodies are composed of tiny particles of 
matter with gaps between them.  That is, “all sensible bodies are aggregated of particles 
laid together wth many interstices or pores between them”.  To support this principle, 
Newton described phenomena such as the absorption of water and other liquids by 
various substances, the ability of acids to dissolve metals, and the transmission of light 
through various substances (e.g. air, water, oil and crystals).  Evidently, this principle was 
an important one for Newton’s theory of optics: 
As by the former  ↑third↑  Principle we gave an account  ↑heretofore↑  of ye motions of all the 
Planets & of ye flux & reflux of ye sea, so by this Principle we shall give an acct in ye following 
treatise give an acct of ye permanent colours of natural bodies, nothing further being requisite for ye 
production of those colours then that ye coloured bodies abound with pellucid particles of a certain 
size & density.27 
And yet, it wasn’t referred to as a ‘principle’ in the Opticks.  In fact, in query 31, Newton 
argued that the proposition that all sensible bodies are composed of hard particles 
“seems to be as evident as the universal Impenetrability of Matter” (Newton, 1952: 389).  
                                                 
26 “Rule 3.  Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted and that belong to all bodies on which 
experiments can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally” (Newton, 1999: 795). 
27 That “the following treatise” deals with colour tells us that this draft is intended for the Opticks 
rather than the Principia. 
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But in query 31 he was more interested in how the particles of matter stick together, than 
in what follows from this idea.  He concluded: 
There are therefore Agents in Nature able to make the Particles of Bodies stick together by very 
strong Attractions.  And it is the Business of experimental Philosophy to find them out (Newton, 
1952: 394). 
And so, Newton thought that the proposition that all sensible bodies are composed of 
tiny particles of matter with gaps in them was true, and presumably deduced from the 
phenomena.  But when it was introduced in query 31, Newton’s focus was different.  
Instead of using this proposition to deduce the properties of coloured bodies, Newton 
wanted to understand how the particles cohere.  So this proposition might have met 
condition (a) but certainly not condition (b). 
To summarise, while all four of Newton’s ‘principles of philosophy’ can be traced in 
Newton’s published work, only one of them was referred to as a ‘principle’.  Moreover, 
that principle was the only one that met the two conditions for being a principle.  This 
case highlights something important about how we should view Newton’s principles.  If 
we focus on content, they look unsystematic.  But when we focus on function, Newton’s 
use of the term starts to look systematic and important.  Thus, if we want to understand 
how Newton used the term ‘principle’, we should focus on the functions of principles, 
rather than their content.  In fact, this lesson can be generalised.  Newton’s approach to 
the term ‘principle’ was similar to his approach to other methodological terms such as 
‘hypothesis’, ‘rule’ and ‘query’.  Namely, the label emphasised the function of the 
proposition, rather than its content.  In the next section, I shall illustrate this general 
point with a case study. 
3.2 Labelling propositions: a case study 
I have argued that, when considering Newton’s use of principles, we should emphasise 
functions over the content of propositions.  When we focus on the functions of the 
principles, rather than their content, Newton’s method of principles looks much more 
systematic.  I now argue that this is a much more general feature of Newton’s 
methodology.  In Newton’s work, it was entirely possible for the same proposition or 
idea to appear in one context with one label, and in another context with a different 
label.  I think this is a fairly important lesson about how to understand Newton’s 
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methodology.  So I shall briefly digress to illustrate this general point by examining 
another draft manuscript: a plan for the fourth book of the Opticks.28 
Several drafts of the Opticks book 4 exist in various stages of development.29  The 
topic of book 4 was to be “the nature of light & ye power of bodies to refract and reflect 
it”.  One draft begins with a list of three items under the heading ‘Observations’:30 
1 Of ye 3 faciae of colours made by inflected light. 
2 Of bent of several rays wch passe at several differences from ye edge of ye knife. 
3 Conclusions concerning ye vernicular motions of ye inflected rays. 
These are clearly topics to be covered by the observations, rather than the observations 
themselves.31 
The draft that I shall focus on here contains a list of propositions.32  But since, as 
Alan Shapiro has pointed out, this is a draft of an outline or plan of the book, rather than 
a draft of the book itself, it contains little in the way of argument and virtually no 
discussion of experimental evidence (Shapiro, 1993: 141-143).  Thus, the propositions are 
things that Newton hoped to prove.  For example: 
Prop. 1.  The refracting power of bodies in vacuo is proportional to their specific gravities. 
Prop. 2.  The refracting power of two contiguous bodies is the difference of their refracting powers 
in vacuo. 
Newton listed about twenty propositions before he made a structural change: he went 
back to proposition 17 and relabelled it ‘hypothesis 1’.  He also added a heading: ‘The 
Conclusion’.  Then he began to re-number the propositions that followed.  By the time 
                                                 
28 In the late 1680s, Newton conceived of the Opticks as a four-volume work.  However, by the early 
1700s, the Opticks had been re-written in three volumes.  Much of the material from book 4 was 
incorporated into book 3 of the Opticks.  For a discussion of the delay in publishing the Opticks, see 
(Shapiro, 2001). 
29 MS. Add. 3970, ff. 335r-336v, 337r-340v, 342r-343r. 
30 MS. Add. 3970, ff. 342r-343r 
31 And these are the topics covered by the observations that were eventually published in book 3 of 
the Opticks. 
32 MS. Add. 3970, ff. 337r-338v. 
 27 
Newton had finished with it, the draft contained eighteen propositions and a conclusion 
consisting of five hypotheses. 
Let’s focus on ‘Hypothesis 2’, which I shall quote in extenso:33 
Prop 18  ↑Hypoth 2↑.  As all the great motions in the world depend upon a certain kind of force 
(vulgarly called gravity wch in this earth we call gravity) whereby great bodies attract one another at 
great distances: so all the minute ↑little↑ motions in ye world depend upon certain kinds of forces 
whereby minute bodies attract or dispell one another at little distances. 
How all the great motions {illeg.} are regulated by the gravity of ↑which↑ great bodies ↑have↑ 
towards one another I shewed at large in my ↑Philosophiae↑ Principia matheamtica {illeg.}  ↑the 
great bodies of ye earth Sun ↑moon↑ & Planets gravitate towards one another what↑ are ye laws of 
& quantities of their gravitating forces at all distance from them & how {illeg.} all ye motions of 
those bodies are regulated by those their gravities I shewed in my Philosophiae naturalis Principia 
matheamtica by such a convincing ↑mathematical↑ way of arguing as has given satisfaction 
procured the assent of {illeg.} as many {illeg.} all the ablest ↑mathematicians {illeg.} have {illeg.} 
↑who have had leasure to↑ had leasure & skill to examine the book Mathematical Principles of 
Philosophy ↑to the satisfaction of my readers↑: And if Nature be most simple & ↑fully↑ consonant 
to her self she observes the same method in regulating the motions of smaller bodies wch she doth 
in regulating those of the greater.  ↑But what↑ This principle of nature being very remote from the 
conceptions of {illeg.} Philosophers I forbore to describe it in my Principles ↑that said Book↑ least 
I should be accounted an extravagant freak & so prejudice my Readers against all those things wch 
were ye main designe of only that the Book: but {illeg.} those things being received by 
Mathematicians & yet I hinted at it both in the Preface of ↑& in↑ ye book it self where I speak of 
the inflection of light & of ye a refaction of & elastic power of ye Air: but the design of ye book 
being secured by the approbation of Mathematicians, I had not doubted ↑scrupled↑ to propose this 
Principle in {illeg.} plane words.  The truth of this Hypothesis I assert not because I cannot prove 
it, but I think it very probable because a great part of the phaenomena of nature do easily flow from 
it wch seem otherways inexplicable [...] (MS. Add. 3970, fols. 338v). 
I. Bernard Cohen has described this as “a ‘whale’ of an hypothesis” (Cohen, 1969: 
320)—and he’s right!  When Newton started writing out this statement, he intended for it 
to be ‘Proposition 18’—a theory.  But at some point, he scratched out ‘Prop 18’, and re-
branded it as ‘Hypoth 2’.  As we’ve seen, for Newton there was an important epistemic 
shift here.  Theories were things that he was able to assert as true.  Hypotheses were 
things that he was unable to assert, because he did not have the evidence.  Newton 
                                                 
33 The draft has been heavily edited, and so many of the words are illegible. 
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probably hoped to assert Proposition 18.  But as he started to explicate it, he must have 
realised that he couldn’t prove it.  Thus, he re-labelled it as a hypothesis—something 
speculative and, thus, uncertain.  Newton also made it clear that he wanted to use this as 
a principle, but he wasn’t certain of it, so he couldn’t. 
When Newton abandoned the idea of a fourth book, and restructured his Opticks, 
this ‘Hypothesis 2’ appears to have been re-worked to become part of ‘Query 31’ in the 
Opticks:34 
Have not the small Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a 
distance, not only upon the Rays of Light for reflecting, refracting, and inflecting them, but also 
upon one another for producing a great Part of the Phaenomena of Nature?  For it’s well known, 
that Bodies act one upon another by the Attractions of Gravity, Magnetism, and Electricity; and 
these Instances shew the Tenor and Course of Nature, and make it not improbable but that there 
may be more attractive Powers than these.  For Nature is very consonant and conformable to her 
self […] (Newton, 1952: 375-376). 
Moreover, similar themes appear in the Principia book 1.  This is a much more 
technical discussion in which Newton aimed to solve “the motion of minimally small bodies 
that are acted on by centripetal forces tending toward each of the individual parts of some great body” 
(Newton, 1999: 622).  In the scholium to propositions 94, 95 and 96, Newton noted that: 
These attractions are very similar to the reflections and refractions of light made according to a 
given ratio of the secants, as Snel discovered, and consequently according to a given ratio of the 
sines, as Descartes set forth.  […] Moreover, the rays of light that are in the air […] in their passing 
near the edges of bodies, whether opaque or transparent […] are inflected around the bodies, as if 
attracted toward them; and those of the rays that in passing approach closer to the bodies are 
inflected the more, as if more attracted […].  And those that pass at greater distances are less 
inflected […].  Therefore because of the analogy that exists between the propagation of rays of light 
                                                 
34 While there is an obvious semantic shift between hypothesis and query—the query is stated as a 
question—this difference is often ignored.  Queries are often interpreted as assertions.  Some scholars have 
argued that this is the only difference between hypotheses and queries: in the Opticks, queries were simply 
Newton’s way of getting around his self-imposed ban on hypotheses.  There is something to this 
suggestion: there is a sense in which the queries employed in the Opticks may be considered de facto 
hypotheses.  However, there is more to the shift than this.  Newton was using the semantic structure of the 
query to explore a possible future research program.  So, while Newton couldn’t prove it himself, he felt 
that it was the kind of thing that could be dealt with in his natural philosophy. 
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and the motion of bodies, I have decided to subjoin the following propositions for optical uses […] 
(Newton, 1999: 625-626). 
And in Newton’s discussion of ‘Rule 3’ in the Principia, he wrote: “[…] nor should we 
depart from the analogy of nature, since nature is always simple and ever consonant with 
itself” (Newton, 1999: 795).  And finally, in Newton’s discussion of proposition 6 in the 
Opticks book 1 part I, he wrote: “That this should be so is very reasonable, Nature being 
ever conformable to her self; but an experimental Proof is desired” (Newton, 1952: 76). 
The lesson is simple.  Here, we have seen that similar ideas emerged in different 
contexts throughout Newton’s work.  The same content was variously referred to as a 
‘hypothesis’, a ‘rule’, a ‘proposition’, a ‘principle’, and even a ‘query’, depending on what 
role it was playing.  This tells us that, if we want to understand Newton’s usage of a 
methodological term such as ‘principle’ or ‘hypothesis’, we should look at what work the 
idea is doing, rather than its content.  And we cannot expect the same idea to always bear 
the same label. 
3.3 Summary 
At the start of this section, I introduced a manuscript concerning Newton’s ‘principles of 
philosophy’.  We have seen that Newton applied the label ‘principle’ to things that are 
deduced from phenomena and function as premises.  Newton’s ‘principles of 
philosophy’ did not necessarily fit these conditions.  Moreover, only one of these 
principles was explicitly labelled as a principle in Newton’s published work.  Interestingly, 
however, traces of these principles are found in Newton’s published work, though not 
labelled in the same way.  These propositions performed different functions in different 
contexts.  So Newton applied the label ‘principle’ in particular contexts; rather than to 
particular propositions in all contexts.  This is an example of a more general point about 
Newton’s methodology: when we want to understand how Newton used his 
methodological terms, we should focus on function, rather than content. 
Finally, a comment about Newton’s ‘Principles of Philosophy’.  We should interpret 
this manuscript very much as a work in progress.  Newton was attempting something 
very ambitious, but it obviously didn’t work out.  It is striking that these principles don’t 
form a coherent ‘system of philosophy’.  That is, there is no framework, mathematical or 
philosophical, that ties the principles together.  This suggests that Newton had a different 
goal in mind, when writing this.  He was trying to give an account of his natural 
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philosophy in broad brush strokes—as befits a preface.35  In his commentary on this 
manuscript, McGuire sheds some light on this intended preface.  He dates the draft to 
late 1703, not long before the Opticks was published (McGuire, 1970: 179).  At that time, 
Newton was focussed on the various conceptual problems arising from his theories of 
universal gravitation and the composition of light, such as extending the application of 
the laws of motion to the smallest units of matter.  “In general he wished to make clearer 
the significance of his natural philosophy” (McGuire, 1970: 178).  One interesting thing 
about this manuscript is that we get the sense that Newton conceives of his two great 
works as two lines of inquiry in a unified natural philosophical project.  They are unified 
by their methodology and by these four principles. 
4 Conclusion 
In a draft methodological fragment, related to the ‘Principles of Philosophy’, Newton 
wrote: 
Thus in the Mathematical Principles of Philosophy I first shewed  ↑from Phænomena↑  that the all 
bodies endeavoured by a certain force proportional to their matter to approach one another, that 
this force in receding from ye body grows less & less in reciprocal proportion to ye square of the 
distance from it & that it was  ↑is↑  equal to gravity & therefore was  ↑is↑  one & the same force 
with gravity.  Then using this force as a Principle of  ↑Philosophy↑  gravity, I shewed how I derived 
from it all the Phænomena of nature motions of the heavenly bodies & the flux & reflux of ye sea, 
shewing by mathematical demonstrations that this force alone was sufficient to produce all those 
Phænomena, & deriving from it (a priori) some  ↑new↑  motions wch Astronomers had not then 
observed but since appeare to be true, as that Saturn & Jupiter draw one another, that ye variation 
of ye Moon is bigger in winter then in summer, that there is an equation of ye Moons meane motion 
amounting to almost 5 minutes wch depends upon the position of her Aphelion Apoge {sic.} to ye 
Sun (MS. Add. 3970. f. 480v). 
I have argued that, when considering Newton’s principles, we should focus on function 
rather than content.  And so it is significant that, in this passage, Newton focused on 
how his theory of universal gravitation was used.  Here Newton claimed that his theory 
of universal gravitation (a) had been deduced from phenomena (i.e. “I first shewed from 
                                                 
35 McGuire has suggested that we should understand these principles in the Boylean sense: they are 
general claims intended to help to “explicate the already known phenomena of nature” (Boyle, 1772: 301-
302, quoted in McGuire, 1970: 180-181).  But, where Boyle understands principles solely as heuristic aids to 
the progress of knowledge, Newton construes them as constitutive statements about the natural world. 
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Phænomena”) and (b) had functioned as a premise (i.e. “I derived from it…”).  It is 
significant for my interpretation of Newton’s principles, that Newton described the latter 
step as “using this force as a Principle”.  I have argued that ‘principle’ was a context-
specific term.  Any kind of theory could be a principle, provided it served the right kind 
of function.  Therefore, it seems appropriate for Newton to talk of using some concept 
as a principle. 
An important lesson emerged from my discussion of Newton’s method of 
principles: labelling or referring to a proposition as a ‘principle’ tells us about the function, 
rather than the content, of the proposition.  I have argued that this is an example of a 
more general feature of Newton’s methodology, namely, that when we study Newton’s 
methodology, we should emphasise functions and distinctions over content.  Newton’s 
use of the term ‘principle’ fits, what I call, his ‘rhetorical style’.  Newton took the already 
familiar term and stretched it to fit his methodology.  It is well known that Newton did 
this with many of his innovative philosophical ideas, such as ‘force’ and ‘mass’.  
However, this is also a feature of many of Newton’s methodological concepts: he 
‘borrowed’ familiar terms and ‘massaged’ them to fit his own needs.  Steffen Ducheyne 
has argued that Newton did this with his dual-methods of analysis and synthesis 
(Ducheyne, 2012: 5).  Because Newton bent methodological terms to fit his needs, it is a 
mistake to focus too closely on the content of propositions.  We should instead 
understand his methodology in terms of the roles which concepts play. 
I’ll close with a final comment about the title of Newton’s Principia.  The origin of 
the title is contentious.  Many have taken it as an open expression of Newton’s hostility 
towards Cartesian science.  The title, Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica, is usually 
recognised as a simple alteration of Descartes’ Principia philosophiæ.  And thus been taken 
as a bold declaration of the anti-Cartesian bias of the work.  However, D. T. Whiteside 
has presented an alternative view.  In a letter to Edmond Halley (20 June 1686), Newton 
discussed the proposed title of the work:36 
The two first books without the third will not so well beare ye title of Philosophiæ naturalis 
Principia Mathematica & therefore I had altered it to this De motu corporum libri duo: but upon 
                                                 
36 (MS. EL/N1/55) 
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second thoughts I retain ye former title.  Twill help ye sale of ye book wch I ought not to diminish 
now tis yors. 
Thus, the title may have been chosen for its marketing potential—in the hopes of 
yielding a profit (Whiteside, 1991: 34).  Whatever its origin, the title captures something 
important about Newton’s work.  The concept of a ‘principle’ came to be closely tied up 
with Newton’s mathematico-experimental method.  And thus, that Newton used his 
method of principles to lay down the foundational premises for his new natural 
philosophy is significant.  The inclusion of the word ‘principles’ in the title of Newton’s 
great work might have been accidental, convenient or even vindictive.  But it turned out 
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